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ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSIONS UNDER
OCGA § 24-3-50,
THE “HOPE OF BENEFIT, FEAR OF
INJURY” STATUTE
Published in The Georgia Defender, p. 3 (January 2002).  There is a caselaw 
update at the end of the article.
Introduction
Georgia criminal defense attorneys know that in a state criminal trial a 
confession may be inadmissible on federal constitutional grounds if it 
was coerced in violation of the 14th Amendment due process clause,1 
elicited in contravention of the right to counsel under the 6th 
Amendment,2  seized in violation of 4th Amendment protections,3 or 
compelled in violation of the 5th Amendment self-incrimination 
privilege as construed in Miranda v. Arizona4 and its progeny.5 
However, some criminal defense lawyers in this state may not realize 
that, regardless of whether it is admissible under the Federal 
Constitution, a confession may be inadmissible in a Georgia court under 
OCGA § 24-3-50, the “hope of benefit, fear of injury” statute, which 
provides: “To make a confession admissible, it must have been made 
voluntarily, without being induced by another by the slightest hope of 
benefit or remotest fear of injury.”
Since around 1940 nearly all the cases construing this statute have 
involved the claim that a confession was induced by hope of benefit; 
claims that a confession was induced by fear of injury are infrequent 
nowadays.
OCGA § 24-3-50 was originally enacted as part of the Georgia Code of 
1863 and has been on the books ever since.6 OCGA § 24-3-50 codifies 
the common law rule that confessions, to be admissible, must be 
voluntary.7 A confession cannot be excluded under OCGA § 24-3-50
unless the defendant makes a timely and proper objection to it in the
trial court.8 When the defendant does file such an objection, he is
entitled to a Jackson v. Denno9 hearing on the confession’s admissibility
if the confession was obtained by a state agent.10  Once the defendant
has correctly lodged his objection based on OCGA § 24-3-50, the state
has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the
confession was voluntary;11and the trial court must, prior to admitting
the confession, make a legal determination that it was voluntary.12
A confession which is involuntary under OCGA § 24-3-50 may not be
used as a prior inconsistent statement to impeach the credibility of a
defendant who takes the stand and testifies.13
Admitting a confession that is involuntary under OCGA § 24-3-50 may
constitute harmless error.14
Traditionally in criminal cases a confession has been distinguished from
an admission.15 Historically, an admission has been defined as an
incriminating statement by the defendant, and a confession as an
admission in which the defendant expressly or directly acknowledges
the fact of his guilt.16 Under this approach, confessions are “thus only
one species of admissions ....”17 The common law rule forbidding use of
involuntary confessions permitted use of an involuntary admission not
amounting to a confession.18 OCGA § 24-3-50, which embodies the
common law rule, specifically uses the term “confession.”  Does OCGA
§ 24-3-50, like the common law rule, apply only to confessions, or does
it extend to admissions as well?  Georgia caselaw is divided on this
question.19 At any rate, the question is less important than it used to be
because of Georgia decisions since 1974 which have redefined
confessions to include many incriminating statements which previously
were deemed to be only admissions.20
Confessions Inadmissible Under OCGA § 24-3-50
Under OCGA § 24-3-50, a confession is inadmissible if it was induced
“by the remotest fear of injury.”  There appear to be only seven reported
cases where a conviction was reversed under the “fear of injury”
language in OCGA § 24-3-50.  Five of these cases were in the Georgia
Supreme Court, with the most recent being handed down in 1929;21 the
two others were decided in the Georgia Court of Appeals in 1907 and
1909 respectively.22 Under this caselaw a defendant’s confession is
involuntary if (1) it resulted from physical brutality inflicted on the
defendant to make him confess,23 (2) the defendant had been beaten or
whipped and the confession resulted from fear that, if he did not
confess, he would again be physically injured,24 or (3) the defendant,
although he had not yet been physically injured, confessed as a
consequence of being threatened (whether by words or deeds) with
physical brutality.25
Even if it was not induced by fear of injury, under OCGA § 24-3-50 a
defendant’s confession is inadmissible if it results from “the slightest
hope of benefit.”  There appear to be only thirteen decisions of the
Georgia Supreme Court where a conviction was reversed or on
interlocutory appeal a confession was suppressed under the “hope of
benefit” provision.26  Five of these decisions date from 1976 or later,
with the most recent in 2000.  There are only four decisions of the
Georgia Court of Appeals reversing a conviction based on this provision
of OCGA § 24-3-50, all decided between 1940 and 1980.27 Under this
caselaw a confession is involuntary if the defendant confessed because
he was (1) advised or urged to confess,28 (2) told or led to believe that he
would receive a lighter or more lenient sentence or punishment if he
confessed,29 or (3) told the case would be settled or compromised if he
confessed.30
Confessions Admissible Under OCGA § 24-3-50
Whereas there are less than thirty appellate cases in which a confession
was held inadmissible under OCGA § 24-3-50, there are around a
hundred appellate cases where a confession was found to be admissible
under OCGA § 24-3-50.31
OCGA § 24-3-50 requires that the hope of benefit or fear of injury be
“induced by another;” a confession induced by hope or fear is not
involuntary under the statute if the hope or fear was self-induced by the
defendant.32 “A hope or fear which originates in the mind of the person
making the confession and which originates from seeds of his own
planting would not exclude a confession.”33 (Where, however, the
improper hope of benefit or fear of injury was not self-induced by the
defendant, the fact that the confession was given to someone other than
the person inducing the hope or fear will not render the confession
voluntary under OCGA § 24-3-50.34)
A confession induced by artifice or deceit is admissible under OCGA §
24-3-50 unless the deception either “is calculated to procure an untrue
statement,”35 or, under the circumstances, “constitut[es] a ‘slightest hope
of benefit or remotest fear of injury’ under OCGA § 24-3-50 ....”36
Under OCGA § 24-3-50, “encouraging a suspect to tell the truth does
not amount to the hope of benefit,”37 and therefore “admonitions to tell
the truth will not invalidate a confession.”38 
Additionally, a confession will not be excludable under OCGA § 24-3-
50 if it is admissible under a companion statute, OCGA § 24-3-51,
which provides: “The fact that a confession has been made under a
spiritual exhortation, a promise of secrecy, or a promise of collateral
benefit shall not exclude it.”39 Under OCGA § 24-3-51, confessions
induced by promises of “a collateral benefit” are admissible
notwithstanding the provisions of OCGA § 24-3-50.40 There are
numerous cases where a confession was held to be voluntary under
OCGA § 24-3-50 because the confession had been induced by a promise
which the court deemed to involve merely “a collateral benefit.”41 
For the past quarter century, the Georgia courts have taken the position
that, with respect to OCGA § 24-3-50, “[g]enerally, the reward of a
lighter sentence for confessing is the ‘hope of benefit’ to which the
statute refers.”42 Furthermore, the promise of lesser punishment “must
relate to the charge or sentence facing the suspect.”43 Thus, practically
any promise of reward made to a defendant which induces him to
confess, except a promise of leniency on the present charges, is deemed
not to violate OCGA § 24-3-50.44
Conclusion
OCGA § 24-3-50, the “hope of benefit, fear of injury” statute,
authorizes suppression of confessions which may or may not be
suppressible under the Federal Constitution.  Couched in “pungent
language,”45 the statute, insofar as involuntary confessions are
concerned, “adopts the strongest and most extreme rule.”46  Despite this,
the statute has been sharply narrowed by judicial interpretation. 
Nonetheless, every lawyer who handles a criminal case in this state
should remember that under the statute a confession of guilt may be
excludable even though the confession was obtained in compliance with
federal constitutional requirements.
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Vergara v. State, 283 Ga. App. 175, 657 S.E.2d 863 (2008) (rejecting
defendant’s contention that his statements given to police were
involuntary and excludable under OCGA § 24-3-50 because the only
factor relied on was a promise that anything he said would not be made
known in court; this is not sufficient because the mere “fact that a
confession has been made under ... a promise of secrecy ... shall not
exclude it” under OCGA § 24-3-51)
Rivera v. State, 282 Ga. 355, 647 S.E.2d 70 (2007) (finding no merit to
defendant’s contention that the investigators’ accommodation of his
request to speak to his wife was the slightest hope of benefit that would
render defendant’s statement involuntary and inadmissible under OCGA
§ 24-3-50)
Preston v. State, 282 Ga. 210, 647 S.E.2d 260 (2007) (where an
interrogating officer gave no explicit promise of a lighter sentence but
only discussed the death penalty and life without parole with the
defendant stating that the district attorney based the charges brought on
a recommendation from the police, did not amount to a promise of a
lighter sentence or benefit of hope under OCGA § 24-3-50; instead the
comments amounted to no more than an explanation of the seriousness
of the situation and admonishment to help; admonitions to tell the truth
will not invalidate a confession)
Hill v. State, 281 Ga. 795, 642 S.E.2d 64 (2007) (finding improper
comments made by police that appellant would serve less jail time and
be able to raise his young children if he confessed, but the statements
were properly admitted without violation of OCGA § 24-3-50 because
at the Jackson v. Denno hearing on the voluntariness of appellant’s
statement, appellant took the stand and responded in the negative to the
question “did [the police] ever promise you anything;” the State bears
the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that a
confession was voluntary, and did so in this case with appellant’s own
testimony)
Stinski v. State, 281 Ga. 783, 642 S.E.2d 1 (2007) (statements by
officers that defendant should help himself, that it was in his “best
interest to tell” what he knew, and that the officers would “take [his]
tape and show the district attorney and the judge” that he did not want to
help himself, did not constitute a hope of benefit and were properly
admitted; in applying OCGA § 24-3-50; it is not improper for the police
to encourage a suspect to help herself by telling the truth; it also does
not render a statement involuntary for the police to tell a suspect that the
trial judge may consider her truthful cooperation with the police)
Redwine v. State, 280 Ga. 58, 623 S.E.2d 485 (2005) (defendant
contends that the statements he gave police were not admissible because
they were induced by hope of benefit under OCGA § 24-3-50; defendant
contends that there was an agreement in place that provided that state
would not seek the death penalty against him in exchange for his
pleading guilty and testifying against Smallwood, and that the third
statement was “part and parcel” of this agreement; lead defense counsel
testified that the plea agreement was in exchange for defendant’s
truthful testimony at trial, and was fully in place before this statement
was made; counsel also testified that he wished defendant to make this
third statement because he viewed it as protection if, after Smallwood’s
trial, the state attempted to renege on the agreement and claim that
defendant’s testimony was not truthful, the full, recorded, third
statement would rebut that claim; such tactical decisions do not render a
resulting statement inadmissible under OCGA § 24-3-50)
Brown v. State, 278 Ga. 724, 609 S.E.2d 312 (2004) (allegations that
defendant would soon be free to go without any charges being filed
were not supported by defendant’s testimony; in defendant’s testimony,
he does not contend that detective mentioned a confession or sentence,
only that detective periodically stated that defendant would be soon
released; nothing suggested that freedom would be forthcoming
if defendant confessed; allowing defendant to overhear statements made
by co-defendant implicating him in the shooting so that he would
confess does not make a confession involuntary; the use of trickery by
police does not render a confession inadmissible, so long as the means
are not calculated to procure an untrue statement)
Pittman v. State, 277 Ga. 475, 592 S.E.2d 72 (2004) (routine police
questioning aimed at eliciting a response from a defense in custody such
as, “I don’t think you knew that she had died. I think you tied her up
thinking she was still alive and you placed her the tub” will not make a
confession inadmissible; the suggestion by officer that defendant did not
intend to kill the victim did not amount to a hope of benefit; informing a
suspect that no drug charges will be brought against him if there is no
evidence against him does not induce hope of benefit)
Robbins v. State, 290 Ga. App. 323, 659 S.E.2d 628 (2008) (finding
defendant’s confession to police was voluntarily given, even though
defendant’s wife was a law enforcement officer who promised the
benefit of no divorce if defendant gave statement admitting to the crime;
the wife’s promise not to divorce, which did not bear on the question of
punishment, was a promise of collateral benefit under OCGA §24-3-51
and not excludable under OCGA §24-3-50)
Valentine v. State, 289 Ga. App. 60, 656 S.E.2d 208 (2007) (finding no
violation of OCGA § 24-3-50 in admitting defendant’s statement where
officers told defendant “it will look a whole lot better on you to tell us
what happened and name the other person, than it will for you to sit
back and not say anything and look like a monster;” such admonitions to
tell the truth will not invalidate a confession; assuming these statements
offer the hope of a lighter sentence, immediately following the
statements by police, defendant asked, “How long will I get?,” and the
interrogating officer responded, “That's something you got to work out
with the D.A.’s office, your attorney and all that kind of stuff;” therefore
any hope of benefit was dispelled by the officer’s statement that he had
no influence over defendant’s possible punishment) 
Rubia v. State, 287 Ga. App. 122, 650 S.E.2d 797 (2007) (the State
bears the burden of showing the voluntariness of a statement by a
preponderance of the evidence, and in determining whether the State has
met its burden “the trial court must consider the totality of the
circumstances;” an officer’s statement that the police as a matter of
policy placed children in the custody of DFACS upon the arrest of their
parents was a mere recounting of fact rather than a threat of injury or
promise of benefit within the meaning of OCGA § 24-3-50; hope of
lighter punishment, induced by one other than the defendant, is usually
the “hope of benefit” referred to in OCGA § 24-3-50)
Swain v. State, 285 Ga. App. 550, 647 S.E.2d 88 (2007) (rejecting a 15-
year-old defendant’s contention on appeal that the trial court erred in
admitting his confession to a police officer; the court found no violation
of OCGA § 24-3-50 because  “[w]hile the detective used some
profanities during the interview, called Swain a liar and a coward, and
told Swain some lies regarding other evidence that they had against him,
the detective did not threaten Swain, nor did the detective promise him
anything in exchange for his confession;” the State bears the burden of
demonstrating the voluntariness of a confession by a preponderance of
the evidence)
Gonzalez v. State, 283 Ga. App. 843, 643 S.E.2d 8 (2007) (officer’s
request of court between two interviews that defendant’s bond be
lowered did not amount to the slightest hope of benefit or render
defendant’s statements involuntary; here, the hope of benefit was not a
reduced sentence but a lowered bond, and a mere promise to reduce
bond does not constitute a “hope of benefit” under OCGA § 24-3-50;
instead, such promise, which does not implicate the sentence or charge
at issue, is a collateral benefit under OCGA § 24-3-51, that does not
make an otherwise admissible confession involuntary)
Smith v. State, 281 Ga. App. 91, 635 S.E.2d 385 (2006) (a trial court’s
determination after a Jackson v. Denno hearing that a statement was
voluntarily made will not be disturbed on appeal unless it was clearly
erroneous; a sheriff who received defendant’s statement testified that he
made no promises of leniency to him, but that when defendant told him
about his drug addiction, he told defendant that he would inform the
court that he needed help; this promise of help with a drug problem did
not bear on the question of punishment, and was thus a collateral
benefit;  under OCGA § 24-3-51, “[t]he fact that a confession has been
made under a spiritual exhortation, a promise of secrecy, or a promise of
collateral benefit shall not exclude it;” defendant’s testimony was
admitted without violating OCGA § 24-3-50)
Wright v. State, 279 Ga. App. 155, 630 S.E.2d 656 (2006) (defendant
argues that his confession was inadmissible under OCGA § 24-3-50
because he feared arrest if he requested an attorney from the
interviewing officer; defendant argues that his question, “[i]f I ask for an
attorney will I be arrested?” should have stopped the interview; law
enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the
suspect clearly request an attorney; if the suspect’s statement is not an
unambiguous or unequivocal request for counsel, the officers have no
obligation to stop questioning; defendant never clearly requested the
presence of an attorney and there is no evidence that his statement was
given in fear of injury or for a hope of benefit; defendant also argued
that his statement should have been excluded because the investigator
lied to him throughout the interview; the use of trickery and deceit to
obtain a confession does not render the confession inadmissible, so long
as the means employed are not calculated to procure an untrue statement)
Rivera v. State, 279 Ga. App. 1, 630 S.E.2d 152 (2006) (defendant
argues that his confession was inadmissible because it was involuntary
and he believed he was being interrogated about his immigration status;
the law enforcement officer testified that he told defendant and co-
defendant Magna-Gonzalez that they were under arrest for being in the
country illegally and that the officers wanted to talk to them about a
robbery; a law enforcement officer’s failure to advise a suspect as to the
crimes about which he is to be questioned prior to the suspect’s waiver
of his Miranda rights is not relevant to the question of whether the
suspect’s waiver was knowing and voluntary)
Davenport v. State, 277 Ga. App. 758, 627 S.E.2d 133 (2006)
(defendant received a letter from victim’s mother stating, “[i]f you
confess right away, come clean, we will ask the Judge for some amount
of mercy. You are the father of my sister’s children and we want you to
be reconciled with God and to your family;” defendant testified that he
interpreted those portions of the letter to mean that if he made certain
statements to the police, the victim’s mother would have the charges
against him dropped and he could get his family back; in a similar case,
Wiley v. State, 245 Ga. App. 580, 538 S. E. 2d 483 (2000), defendant’s
statements were not induced by hope of benefit when parents of victim
stated, “if you talk to us now, maybe we can work this out, if you tell us
the truth now;” here, defendant’s claim is contradicted by the text of the
letter; had the victim’s mother intended to drop the charges against
Davenport if he confessed, there would be no need to seek mercy from
the court)
State v. Parks, 273 Ga. App. 682, 616 S.E.2d 456 (2005) (use of trickery
to obtain a confession does not render the confession inadmissible so
long as the means employed are not calculated to procure an untrue
statement; trickery may compromise the voluntariness of a statement if
it constitutes “the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury;”
unlike Richardson v. State, 265 Ga. App. 711, 596 S. E. 2d 565 (2004),
where the court disapproved of the interviewing officer’s suggestion to
appellant that he would not be arrested and charged based on “how the
interview went” because it induced false benefit of hope, the officer here
stated to defendant that “he was free to go, period;” this statement did
not compromise the voluntariness of the statements by defendant)
Awolusi v. State, 273 Ga. App. 332, 615 S.E.2d 177 (2005) (no
indication exists in the statute, OCGA § 24-3-50, that it applies only to
confessions made to state actors or agents; the statute therefore applies
to private actors as well as to government entities and officers; even
when made to a witness who is not a state agent, as in this case, a
confession must be voluntary to be admissible for any purpose under
OCGA § 24-3-50; the Macy’s interview did not violate Awolusi’s rights
and the statement she signed there was admissible and freely and
voluntarily given)
State v. Johnson, 273 Ga. App. 324, 615 S.E.2d 163 (2005) (a mere
promise to reduce bond does not constitute a “hope of benefit” under
OCGA § 24-3-50; however, telling a defendant that she would be held
in jail for one year without any opportunity for bond if she did not
confess, and if she did confess she would be released the next day, does
constitute an inducement to confess through a hope for a benefit)
Pauser v. State, 271 Ga. App. 259, 609 S.E.2d 193 (2005) (OCGA § 24-
3-50 does not apply to defendant’s custodial statement because he did
not confess to the crimes for which he was being charged with; even if
OCGA § 24-5-50 did apply, the promise of a reduction in bond is a
collateral benefit that does not make an otherwise admissible confession
an involuntary one) 
Jones v. State, 270 Ga. App. 233, 606 S.E.2d 288 (2004) (defendant
asserts that officer’s statement that they did not want to get a warrant
and their praise of his efforts at turning his life around led him to believe
that he might not get charged because he was cooperating with them;
defendant asked the detectives if they would promise that he would not
go to prison in connection with the robberies; officer Guest responded,
“I’m not allowed to make promises [sic]—all—all I can do is say look,
this man is on the straight and narrow. He’s straightened his life out.
You know, I—I’m giving you a chance right now to tell me you side of
it. That’s all—you know—you know we know what we’re talking
about;” the officers made no promises to defendant that he would not go
to jail; nor was there any representation that he might receive a lighter
sentence; here, there was no violation of OCGA § 24-3-50)
Getake v. State, 269 Ga. App. 558, 604 S.E.2d 611 (2004) (defendant’s 
contention that detectives mislead him to believe that any consensual 
sexual activity with J.S., a minor, would not constitute a crime was not 
supported by evidence and could not be construed as an offering of 
lighter punishment; inaccurate information about the sentence defendant 
was facing could not induce a slight benefit of hope because it was 
given after defendant confessed)
Cummings v. State, 266 Ga. App. 799, 598 S.E.2d 116 (2004) (for a 
confession to admissible, it must have been made voluntarily, without 
being induced by another by the slightest hope of benefit or the most 
remote fear of injury; giving a statement to the police in an effort to seek 
a deal does not create a hope of benefit induced by another and is 
therefore admissible; no promises were made to the defendant and 
defendant acknowledges this statement by an officer prior to giving his 
own statement, “We’ve told you we can’t make deals, all we can do is 
tell the D.A. that you cooperated with us, and I believe that’s what 
we’ve told your attorney. Is that all right?;” it is well established that a 
police officer is not offering a hope of benefit by telling a suspect that 
his cooperation and truthfulness will be made known to others)
Jones v. State, 266 Ga. App. 717, 598 S.E.2d 366 (2004) (a written 
promise to put in a good word for defendant does not constitute a hope 
of benefit; any benefit to be derived by the hope that the police officers 
would put in a good world for Clemons was purely collateral; there was 
no promise of a lighter punishment) 
Richardson v. State, 265 Ga. App. 711, 595 S.E.2d 565 (2004) (the use 
of trickery and deceit to obtain a confession does not render it 
inadmissible so long as the means employed are not calculated to 
procure an untrue statement; this principle is not without exception; the 
employment of deceit may result in the inadmissibility of a statement in 
those situations where the particular deception used, by constituting a 
“slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury,” has induced a party
to confess, thereby rendering the confession involuntary; while the
“hope of benefit” contained in OCGA § 24-3-50 has been interpreted 
generally as a reward of lighter punishment on the charges, we find that
“hope of benefit” may also include, as in this case, the reward of no
charges at all; here, however, the admission of the involuntary
confession was harmless error)
Porter v. State, 264 Ga. App. 526, 591 S.E.2d 436 (2003) (it is not
improper for an officer to make the statement, “you better decide right
now whether you’re going to tell the truth and you’re going to let us try
to help you or whether you’re just going to lie?” to induce a confession;
a confession is inadmissible if induced by “slightest hope of benefit,”
which has been interpreted as a more lenient sentence; offers of help or 
possibly avoiding a jury by an officer will not render a confession inadmissible)
Jackson v. State, 262 Ga. App. 451, 585 S.E.2d 745 (2003) (defendant 
contends he was improperly induced into confession because the
detectives promised to help him get a bond if he was cooperative and
truthful about the robbery and the identities of his accomplices; this
court has held that the promise of reduced bond is a “collateral benefit”
that will not bar a confession under OCGA § 24-3-50; it is well
established that a police officer does not offer a hope of benefit by
telling a suspect that his cooperation and truthfulness will be made
known to others)
Chandler v. State. 261 Ga. App. 639, 583 S.E.2d 494 (2003) (defendant 
argues the interrogating officer induced him to confess by offering some
hope of benefit; after confessing, the interviewing officer asked: “What
do you … think should happen to you?;” defendant replied that he need
help and that he did not think he “could last through any jail time;” the
officer asked defendant why he thought he should not go to jail, and he 
responded that he should not go because he was “scared;” defendant had 
already confessed to crimes prior to the portions of the interrogation he
now challenges; even if the questions were improper, it had no bearing
on the previous confession and did not affect its voluntary nature)
Pinckney v. State, 259 Ga. App. 309, 576 S.E.2d 574 (2003)
(examination of the circumstances as a whole will determine whether a
confession was given voluntarily; however, contending a confession was
false because it was made to “please” the interviewing official will not
invalidate the confession without its being induced by hope of benefit or
remotest fear of injury contained in OCGA § 24-3-50; regardless of
whether the police officer’s statements, “Did you touch her
anywhere?...[O]kay, I mean, if you did, I mean, you know, you’re not in
any danger at this point” are misleading or not, the test for the
admissibility of a confession obtained by use of trickery or deceit is
whether the means employed are calculated to procure an untrue statement)
Griffin v. State, 257 Ga. App. 167, 570 S.E.2d 611 (2002) (“slightest
hope of benefit” means the hope of a lighter sentence; insofar as
“remotest fear of injury” is concerned, any confession obtained through
physical or mental torture is inadmissible; police officer’s statement,
“Have you got anything in your past? Because if you don’t tell me the
truth, there ain’t nothing I can do to help you,” did not convey the hope
of a lighter sentence and therefore the resulting confession was not
inadmissible; an officer may tell a defendant that he would be helping
himself by telling the truth; telling defendant that his girlfriend might
get in trouble because she drove the getaway car does not promise a
lighter sentence)
